Sunday, January 10, 2010

original 55.ori.7732 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

On May 5, 2004, another letter suspected to be from BTK was sent to Kansas television station KAKE-TV. The letter was three pages. On the first page was typed "The BTK Story," under which was a list of chapters taken from Court TV's Crime Library story on the killer, Ron Sylvester reported in The Wichita Eagle. Intriguingly, some of the chapter titles were changed from those listed in Crime Library original story. For example, Chapter 7 originally titled "BTK- The Next Step" was changed to "PJ's," Chapter 4 titled "BTK- Different Worlds Collide" was altered to read "Fantasy World" and the chapter titled "BTK Cold Case Squad" was changed to "Will There (Be) More?"


The second page of the letter was titled "Chapter 8" and contained word puzzles with letters in vertical rows, Jeanene Kiesling reported in a May KAKE-TV article. On the last page were photocopies of business ID's belonging to two men, one a former Southwestern Bell worker and the other a former employee of the Wichita public school district, the Associated Press reported in June. According to the article, the phone company employee was later contacted but he could not understand why a photocopy of his ID was in the letter. Upon further investigation, the school district employee listed on the card did not exist and the logo of the school used on the card had been discontinued. Interestingly, the three-page letter was different from the March letter sent to The Wichita Eagle in that the return address on the envelope bore the name Thomas B. King (TBK) instead of Bill Thomas Killman (BTK), Sylvester reported.

It didn't take long for the FBI to authenticate the letter as a genuine BTK communication, believed to have been his third in a three-month period. The first known communication in 2004 was the March 19th letter sent to The Wichita Eagle. The second known communication allegedly by BTK was an anonymous letter sent to Wichita's KSN-TV in April 2004, which purportedly contained a photo of an unidentified baby.

There was no doubt that the killer was back to his old habit of taunting police. However, it is likely that he was also providing them with vital clues to his identity and details regarding his past murders. It was suggested that the killer may have used the IDs represented in the letter to gain access to the victims' homes. Moreover, police alleged that the chapter titled "PJ's" could be a clue linking the killer to a faculty member at Wichita State University.

Many wondered why the killer chose this point in time to resurface. Some believed that the killer reemerged because he missed the media attention, which he seemed to crave. There is also a chance that his most recent communications were a warning that he might strike again in the near future. BTK's new letters have re-ignited the investigation into the killer, as well as the community's fears of more brutal murders. Many wonder whether the BTK killer can be captured before he gets a chance to kill again.

Thursday, December 24, 2009

convinced 9.con.1145 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Gail Katz was an attractive young woman from a solidly middle-class Long Island Jewish family. But she was a troubled girl suffering from low self-esteem, depression and anxiety. A bright girl, she nevertheless dropped out of college, popped Quaaludes and other pills, and drank more than she should. At one point, all of her neuroses, chemical dependencies and too much alcohol ganged up on her and she tried to commit suicide after breaking up with a boyfriend.

Unlike her sister, who was studying to be a lawyer, Gail was drifting without a clear goal in life. She flitted from relationship to relationship, none of them permanent. Then in 1979, at the age of 23 she met Bob Bierenbaum, a young doctor at Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York City. He had a very high IQ, played the guitar, flew small planes and wasn't bad looking. Better yet, he came from a good family and his father was an accomplished physician.

Bob pressed the relationship and soon they were engaged. Gail's parents were ecstatic: not only was he Jewish, but he was a doctor as well. Gail's practical side finally surfaced and she decided that, even though she did not really love Bob and didn't find him sexually attractive, he was too good a matrimonial catch to ignore.

Before they were married, she told her girlfriends of some unusual incidents that would come up many times in the future. Gail told people that Bob had admitted to inadvertently killing his former fiancée's cat. Then, when a stray cat that Gail picked up annoyed Bob, she claimed that he tried to kill the animal. To protect it, she took it to an animal shelter.

She also mentioned scenes that suggested that Bob was irrational and prone to fits of rage over things like finding her smoking.

Every one to whom she confided these incidents urged her to break off the engagement, particularly since she had serious doubts about her feelings about Bob.

To keep her parents happy and not lose a potentially huge meal ticket, Gail went ahead with the marriage. Things seemed to deteriorate almost immediately. They fought loudly and frequently. Once, she called the police and charged that he tried to choke her.

On the positive side, she went back to finish her college degree, but looked for extramarital relationships to satisfy the gaps in her relationship with Bob. Bob seemed to immerse himself in his career and was making himself into a first-class Manhattan surgeon.

The Surgeon's Wife
The Surgeon's Wife

Sunday morning, July 7, 1985, everything came to a head. According to Kieran Crowley, author of the very detailed book on the case, The Surgeon's Wife, "Gail, her pretty face contorted with rage, screeched a final ultimatum at Bob. She told him he was pathetic. She revealed her affairs, including her claimed liaison with an Arab. She declared that she loved another man and that she never loved Bob."

Mae Eisenhower in the apartment below heard the fight and said that it was followed by a loud slamming of a door, suggesting that one of the two combatants upstairs had stormed out of the apartment.

Shortly afterwards, one of Gail's friends called and Bob told her that Gail had gone out.

At 3 p.m., a retired textile executive, Joel Davis, saw a woman in a bagel shop that he was convinced was Gail.

At 3:30 p.m., Bob rented a Cessna at Caldwell Airport for a 2-hour flight. Afterwards, he attended his nephew's birthday party. Then he went to his friend's home and during the evening there called his house a couple of times to see if Gail had returned. Bob went home late that evening to an empty apartment.

The next day, Bob called around to several of Gail's friends, colleagues and relatives to see if they knew her whereabouts. He explained that they had argued and Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire had walked out.

Nobody had seen her and nobody had heard from her. She had simply vanished.

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

nothing Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Jeanne Durkin lived on the streets, mostly in the doorway of an abandoned bakery two buildings away from Goldie's. She was 28 and a potentially easy victim for rape or murder. Her body was found by a restaurant employee beneath a storage truck (according to Newton, however, she was found beneath a fruit and vegetable stand) on a Pratt Street lot west of Frankford Avenue owned by a fruit vendor, and she had been stabbed in the chest, buttocks, and back 74 times. This was one block from where Helen Patent had been killed. Lying in a pool of blood, Durkin was nude from the waist down, and her legs were spread. Blood was spattered against a fence and the side of the truck. An autopsy indicated that she had been sexually assaulted.

The Serial Killer Files, by Harold Schechter
The Serial Killer Files, by Harold Schechter
Once she became victim #4, the newspaper began to pressure the police to solve these crimes. It was clear by now that Philadelphia had a serial killer on the loose. In fact, between 1985 and 1989, the City of Brotherly Love experienced three separate series of brutal murders. While the crimes of the Frankford Slasher were being investigated, the police learned from a woman who had escaped about an eccentric man who was holding females prisoner in his house on North Marshall Street. Harold Schechter tells the story in The Serial Killer Files. One captive had died from hanging in chains for several days and one had been killed. The police invaded the home and found three more nearly dead women chained in a filthy basement. A man named Gary Heidnik had used them as sex slaves. After his arrest, he admitted to eating pieces of one victim and feeding some to his other prisoners.

Gary Heidnik in custody
Gary Heidnik in custody
Then, on a sweltering August day in 1987, Harrison "Marty" Graham was evicted from his north Philadelphia apartment because of obnoxious odors. He left, but the smell worsened, so the police went in. They discovered the decomposing corpses of six women, with the remains of a seventh. Graham tried to claim that the bodies were there when he moved in, but then confessed to strangling them all during sex. Despite his insanity plea, a judge convicted him in every case.

Harrison "Marty" Graham
Harrison "Marty" Graham
The authorities quickly formed a task force to canvass the Frankford Avenue neighborhood to see if they could find anyone who had witnessed anything related to the victims. They questioned a female bartender at Goldie's for several hours because she had seen the women, and even knew that Durkin often came in during the winter to get warm. They also talked with many other customers, past and present. The bartender, Dee Hughes, told Thomas Gibbons from the Inquirer that she figured the killer was a customer. "I honestly believe it was someone that comes in here and got to know them." She indicated a man whom she suspected, but could not offer anything that she had actually seen. Olszef had been in the bar only three days before she was murdered, and she talked to people, but Carroll generally kept to herself and bought her own drinks.

According to the interviews, those who knew the fourth victim did not believe she could have been overwhelmed easily. At one point, when six policemen had tried to arrest her, she struggled so much that they gave up. That led investigators to believe that she may have known her attacker, and that he had used cunning, not strength, to get her into a vulnerable position. A woman named Michelle Martin, who also frequented the Frankford Avenue bars, had argued with Durkin over a blanket just the night before, but nothing more actually tied Martin to the victim. In and out of mental institutions, Durkin had been living on the streets for the past five years. She was savvy and independent. Some people felt the same about Helen Patent, believing she would never have gone with a stranger to the train yard. Police were stumped.

On January 20, fifty people from the neighborhood brought candles to the El to pray for the victims and alert the killer that they were on the lookout for him. Many wept for the street woman, the mother of four, who had been a part of their community. Among them was a man who had hoped to marry her by summer. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire In Israel, two trees were planted in her memory.

By January 1988, as recorded in the papers, the police had tentatively decided that the killings might not be related, despite the similar circumstances. But over the next year, they had to rethink this position.

Thursday, July 30, 2009

Joachim von Ribbentrop 4.jvr.00 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD



(g) Japanese‑French Relations.



197. France Protests Against Japanese Aggression.



After the signing of the armistice with Germany in 1940, France was without strength to fight against ill treatment at the hands of Axis powers, though it made many ineffective protests. On June 10, 1941, French Ambassador Arsene Henry called on Foreign Minister Matsuoka to pro­test against the mistreatment of French missionaries by the Japanese after the occupation of Weichow, an island off the coast of South China. Rumors were also circulating, he said, that two white men, who had been missing since 1940, had met with foul play at the hands of the Japanese. Furthermore, he complained that one exiled Chinese minister and six nuns were under strict Japanese surveillance, and all religious activities had been banned. Since the French Ambassador then requested that the Chinese minister and the nuns be permitted to leave the island, Mr. Matsuoka ordered Japanese officials in Canton to make a careful investigation. [807]

The French Ambassador had also protested against the handing over of documents to the Japanese because this might be disadvantageous to French rights and interests in the unoccupied



[802] II, 784.

[803] II, 785.

[804] II, 786.

[805] II, 787.

[806] II, 788.

[807] II, 789.



154



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



areas of China. However, by way of reply, the Chief of the Japanese East Asia Bureau, on June 18, 1941, advised a French Commerical attaché that the attitude of the French authorities was creating an unfavorable impression among the Japanese. [808]

As early as June 7, 1941 Japanese diplomats had been informed that the Japanese army in Indo-China had decided to seize and requisition property destined for China, but that France's fears as to an infringement upon its sovereignty would be alleviated by a Franco‑Japanese agreement. [809]



198. France Begins Collaboration With Germany (June, 1941).



During the five‑month interval from the dismissal of Vice Premier Pierre Laval by Marshal Philippe Petain in December 1940 to the time of the Berchtesgaden conferences of May 1941, there had been no friendly political relations between France and Germany. However, Ambas­sador Sotomatsu Kato, in an important report, informed Tokyo on June 11, 1941 that because of the success of Germany in the Balkans, the Vichy government had decided that its only remaining alternative was cooperation with Germany. Declarations of such cooperation had come in rapid succession from Marshal Petain and Vice Premier Darlan on the heels of the Berchtesgaden conferences, and the Vichy government had begun to propagandize in favor of Franco‑German collaboration, while steadily putting it in practice. On the other hand, Mr. Kato pointed out that no clear pattern of German‑French collaboration had yet manifested itself. [810]

Though a large part of France would continue to be occupied by German soldiers, there would be a large number of Anglo‑American sympathizers who would act in unison with General de Gaulle. Furthermore, the conclusion of a separate peace either by France or Germany was a problem that could not be settled at this time, since the return by Germany of occupied territory to France was hardly conceivable during war. In view of conditions which would result from America's inevitable participation in the war, Germany was considering the protection of French possessions, which might be used as bases by enemy countries.

As far as the continent of Europe was concerned, according to Ambassador Kato, France could see that a German victory was inevitable. Germany, as the leading power after the war, would abolish meaningless boundary lines while respecting the autonomy and independence of the various peoples of Europe. It would, however, expect all to work together for the common welfare and interest.

France‑German collaboration was necessary, Ambassador Kato further indicated, since Germany recognized that the establishment of this new order in Europe would be very difficult without France's cooperation. [811] But on June 12, 1941, Foreign Minister Matsuoka informed Ambassador Kato that though he was anxious for a German‑French agreement to bring peace to Europe, he had no plan to act as mediator between France and Germany. [812]



199. Japan Requests German Aid in Acquiring Indo‑Chinese Bases.



Deeming it advisable to secure the support of her Axis partners, Japan, on July 16, 1941 advised Germany of its desire for airplane bases in French Indo-China, as well as for free access



[808] II, 790.

[809] II, 791.

[810] II, 792.

[811] II, Ibid.

[812] II, 793.



155



for its warships to the ports of that area. Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was asked to persuade the Vichy government to agree secretly to these proposals, and to urge French Indo-China officials to acquiesce without misgivings concerning Japan's intentions so that the expansion and strengthening of Japanese forces could begin. Foreign Minister Matsuoka added, "It goes without saying that our Empire has no intention of invading French Indo-China". Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

If German intercession did not succeed, the Japanese government was determined to employ whatever measures were necessary. [814] On June 17, 1941, a list of the French Indo-­Chinese airports and harbors to be used by Japan, selected in order of their importance by Japan and French Indo-China, was sent to Berlin. [815]



200. Japan Requests Germany to Withdraw from French Indo‑Chinese Negotiations.



It soon became apparent that the Japanese Foreign Minister had misgivings concerning Germany's ability to persuade Vichy to accept Japan's proposal, since he requested Herr von Ribbentrop not to attempt negotiations unless success were absolutely assured. He feared that if a publicity leak divulged that the Japanese were persuading Germany to exert pressure on Vichy, all further Japanese plans would be thwarted. [816] This warning was further emphasized on June 22, 1941 by Foreign Minister Matsuoka who added that if occupation could not be achieved by diplomacy, his government was determined to obtain its objective by force. [817]

Japan had also decided during June 1941 to take charge of the rubber exports of French Indo-China, of which 8,875 tons were awaiting shipment. The acquiring of the rubber supply was to depend, however, on future negotiations with the French government. [818]

Japanese authorities concluded, by July 4, 1941, that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop would not succeed in his attempts to have the Vichy government accede to Japanese demands, and for this reason, requested him to refrain from speaking of the matter. Japan would undertake its own negotiations with Vichy, and if its request were refused, it would fight. After hostilities began, however, verbal assistance might be requested from Germany. [819]



201. Japan Presses France to Recognize the Nanking Government.



That France might be more favorably inclined toward Japan in future negotiations, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, on June 28, 1941, advised Tokyo not to press the issue of French recognition of the Wang regime. Despite Japanese Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima's advice that this matter be dropped, Tokyo insisted that France be pressed to recognize its puppet government in China. [820] However, France did not recognize the People's Government in China at this time, nor did it during 1941.



[813] II,, 794, 795.

[814] II, 794.

[815] II, 796.

[816] II, 797.

[817] II, 798, 799.

[818] II, 800.

[819] II, 801, 802.

[820] II, 803, 804.



156



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR





202. Japan Desires a Joint Defense Treaty for French Indo-China.



Foreign Minister Matsuoka informed his representative in Vichy, on July 8, 1941, that an agreement should be negotiated between the two countries for the joint defense of French Indo-China, and since he desired the basic negotiations to take place at Vichy, he urged the Japanese Ambassador to France to act with great assurance and firmness. [821] Meanwhile, every effort was being made by Japan to win the good will of the French Indo‑Chinese people. As a measure to increase Japanese influence in that area, Mr. Matsuoka decided to comply with a request that Japanese airplanes be sold to French authorities to increase air service between Japan and Thailand. [822]



203. French Resistance to Japanese Economic Control.



On July 11, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador in Vichy was informed that ratification of the economic treaty between Japan and French Indo-China had taken place. Just before its adoption Japan had decided to dispatch an investigating committee to French Indo-China to look after Japanese rights and interests as enumerated in Article 5 of the protocol. When informed of this plan, the French had protested that such a survey would have to be referred to the economic conference called for in Article 7 of the protocol, and that an investigating committee could not be allowed until it had been approved by the conference.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka explained that because this difficulty had arisen just before the ratification of the treaty, Japan had refrained from taking any issue with the French in this matter. However, Japan would refuse to recognize France's position, since it was absolutely necessary that it make a survey of the natural resources of French Indo-China to permit planning for their development.

Mr. Matsuoka feared that the French were trying to prevent Japan's economic advance, and regretted that French Indo-China appeared to have no intention of cooperating with Japan. The French were expected to accede to Japan's request in this matter just as Japan had planned it. [823] The chairman of the investigating committee was to be given the status of an envoy, and several others from headquarters were to. reside in French Indo-China to keep in touch with French authorities. Other experts, also, were to be sent from Japan from time to time, to make investigations in regard to mining, agricultural and forestry industries, and marine products. [824]



204. Axis Cooperation in French Indo-China Trade.



On July 11, 1941, in a report from Vichy, it was learned that since the Germans had agreed to the Japanese schedule for shipping rubber and other strategic materials, the Japanese Ambas­sador at Vichy had asked a French agent to arrange at once for the shipping of these supplies. The French agent professed to know of no understanding between Germany and France concerning French Indo‑Chinese rubber destined for France, and asked that an inquiry be made. [825] Tokyo assured its Ambassador in Vichy that the Germans had agreed to its pro­posals, and urged prompt action on the part of the French. [826]





[821] II, 805.

[822] II, 806

[823] II, 807

[824] II, Ibid.

[825] II, 808.

[826] II, 809, 810.



157



205. Japan Delivers an Ultimatum to France (July 12, 1941).



On July 12, 1941 after an early warning to Japanese representatives in Vichy to keep the legation force in readiness for important messages, Tokyo sent the terms of an ultimatum to France. [827] Japan declared that because of new international conditions, both the acquisition of military bases and the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China were necessary for the establishment of Japan's "Far Eastern Sphere of Co‑Prosperity". Since America and England had been constricting Japan by encirclement, Japan's southern expansion was vital to its existence and self defense. The occupation would be without bloodshed, according to Mr. Matsuoka, if the French cooperated. A speedy completion of negotiations was necessary so that the United States and Great Britain would have no time to interfere. [828]

Japan realized that France would find this military request strange, but the occupation was necessary because of current conditions. [829] France was to be assured that Japan had no designs of infringement upon French Indo-China, although Japanese authorities knew that French factions not desiring to cooperate with Japan were plotting with the British and Americans. Professing to be deeply concerned over the threat of encirclement of Japan by various foreign powers, Mr. Matsuoka warned French authorities that an unfavorable situation would result should French Indo-China secede from France and come under the control of another foreign power. Therefore, to safeguard French Indo-China from invasion by a third power, as in the case of Syria, France was obliged to cooperate with Japan. Furthermore, since France intended to guarantee the safety of French Indo-China, it would have to join hands, militarily, with Japan. Mr. Matsuoka pointed out that it was clear in the light of recent events that defeated France was not in a position to defend its colonies in every part of the world. Thus, the only way for France to save French Indo-China was to place absolute confi­dence in Japan, and to accept its proposals without reservation. [830]



206. Terms of Japanese Ultimatum to France.



Giving France eight days to consider the ultimatum, Tokyo demanded that it accept by July 20, 1941 the following terms relating to the joint defense of French Indo-China:



(a) (Japan's) Dispatching to southern French Indo-China the required number of troops, several ships and the required number of air detachments.

(b) To permit the use and our establishment of the facilities at the following places:

Air bases SIEMU‑REABU:

8 places: BUNOPEN:

TURAN:

N‑YATORAN:

BIENHOA:

SAIGON:

SOKUTORAN: and

KONBON‑TOHATUSIYU.



Naval bases SAIGON: and KAMURANH

2 places



Note: With the exception of Saigon and Bienhoa, these place names in French Indo-China are in Kana spelling.



[827] II, 811.

[828] II, 812.

[829] II, 813.

[830] II, 814.



158



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR





(c) To recognize the right of the expeditionary force to conduct maneuvers, to reside, and to freely move about and to provide special facilities for these purposes. (This includes a cancellation of all matters in the NISHIHARA-MARUTAN Agreement placing a limitation upon the right of residence and freedom of movement of the expedi­tionary force.)

(d) To take all suitable measures in order to prevent a collision between the French Indo-China forces and the Japanese forces at the points of landing or thereabouts which will be specified in a special telegram.

(e) Recognition of the principal conditions relative to the movement of the expeditionary forces. (The landing forces are the same as those mentioned in (b) . . .

(f) As regards details of the expeditionary force, they should be decided at a conference to be held at the military headquarters in French Indo-China (the SUMIDA Organization) with the French Indo-China authorities after the French authorities have approved of our proposal. However, in case these details have not been agreed upon by the time the landing forces have arrived at the points of landing, they should be decided after the landing has been accomplished.

(g) To issue currency for the use of the expeditionary force. [831]



In addition to these terms, French Indo‑Chinese authorities were to guarantee partial support to the Japanese Army of Occupation. [832] In a letter, which was to be presented to the Vichy government by the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Matsuoka further stipulated, on July 12, 1941, that the French government, to avoid collision between Japanese and French forces, should withdraw French Indo-China garrisons and air forces from points at which Japanese forces would be disembarking. In case the French government complied with these proposals, the agreement in regard to joint defense was to take the form of a protocol, whereas details concerning the Japanese expeditionary forces, which would be decided by the military authori­ties of the two countries, would be incorporated in a treaty. [833]



207. Japan Attempts to Justify its Ultimatum.



For the information of Mr. Andre Roban, the French plenipotentiary to French Indo-China, a message from Mr. Matsuoka, also on July 12, 1941, summarized Japanese demands concerning French Indo-China. Mr. Roban was informed that Japanese requests for military bases were made unavoidably in the defense of the rights of Japan's position in the Far East. Since he was well aware of the war situation, and particularly of conditions in the Far East, the French plenipotentiary was asked to offer Japan's expressions of friendship to his government and to urge the acceptance of Japan's proposals. Foreign Minister Matsuoka declared that he knew full well the previous efforts of Mr. Roban to maintain Franco‑Japanese friendship, but requested that he go to even greater trouble in this most serious problem. [834]



208. Japan Points to Secret American and British Agreements.



In further justification of the ultimatum, the Japanese government, again on July 12, 1941, issued summaries reviewing the political, military, and economic threats to Japan's position in the Far East. Tokyo argued not only that the de Gaulle faction in French Indo-China was working against Japan, but that England, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands Indies, and the United States had entered into an agreement for the joint defense of the Pacific, and had brought about the participation of Chiang Kai‑Shek in their united front.



[831] II, 815.

[832] II, 816.

[834] II, 817.

[835] II, 818.



159



According to Mr. Matsuoka, a secret British‑French agreement of January 1941 provided for British control of certain fast French ships whenever they entered Japanese waters, or if war broke out between France and Japan. Furthermore, on March 19, 1941, England and China had signed a military agreement, covering aid to the Chinese and a joint defense of Burma. [835] Construction of the Burma railroad was planned, and in addition, the United States had entered into an agreement with China for the joint use of Chinese air fields after the arrival of its military fliers. Furthermore, on the basis of the British‑American‑Chinese agreement, preparations were afoot in Singapore to establish an allied general staff. Mr. Matsuoka stated that a British‑Chinese military alliance would be concluded between July 10 and July 20, 1941, and would become effective at the same time that Japan moved to the south.

England was expected to bring about military, political, and economic pressure, and particu­larly the last, by freezing Thaiese funds in London. [836] Consequently, Japan felt that it must expand economically, since England and the United States had already started an embargo against Japan of petroleum and other essential goods. British scrap iron, nickel, hemp bags, jute, manganese, rubber, tin and bauxite were also being embargoed, and through pressure brought to bear by America and England, the supply of rice, rubber, tin, and other goods reaching Japan from Thailand and French Indo-China was decreasing. Thus, since Britain, the United States, China, and the Netherlands were daily making stronger military prepara­tions, and the possibility of encirclement was becoming greater, it had become necessary for Japan to take the initiative. [837]



209. Tokyo Issues Propaganda in Explanation of Its Action in French Indo-China.



For the information of its representatives in the Far East, Tokyo, on July 17, 1941, outlined several reasons for the establishment of Japanese military bases and the stationing of troops in French Indo-China. Japanese diplomats were directed to explain, on the pretext of pre­senting their own personal opinions, that Japan had no intention of using bases in the southern part of French Indo-China as jumping‑off places for further military penetration. Tokyo further argued that the territorial integrity of French Indo-China had to be guaranteed to protect Japan's interests, and that the occupation had to be effected to avoid possible clashes with the Netherlands East Indies and in the Malaya area. [838]

Japan also claimed that the procurement of needed materials in French Indo-China and Thailand was a matter of life or death, and that its position was being endangered by the anti-Japanese attitude of both Britain and the United States, which were urging the de Gaulle faction and the Chinese in the southern part of French Indo-China to oppose Japan. Added to this were the reports of a Sino‑British alliance, and the activities of the United States air forces in China. Therefore, Japan claimed that for reasons of self‑defense, it could no longer delay its movement into French Indo-China. [839]



[835] II, 819, 820.

[836] II, 820.

[837] II, 821.

[838] II, 822.

[839] II, 823.



160



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



210. French Foreknowledge of Japanese Plans.



As to the disposition of France toward an occupation of French Indo-China, Ambassador Kato reported concerning a talk he had with Vice Premier Darlan on July 1, 1941, from which he had received a strong impression that the Vice Premier "had never dreamed of anything like this." Later, however, in a conference between Japanese and French military officials, just a few days before the presentation of the Japanese ultimatum, the French representatives had asked questions which indicated that they had learned of Japan's plans, although the Japanese representatives had professed to know nothing concerning the matter. [840]



211. The Hankow Incident (July 12, 1941).



Simultaneously with the sending of its ultimatum to Vichy, Japan was forced to turn its attention to Hankow, China, where a clash, considered by the Japanese Naval authorities to have grave international complications, occurred in the French concession on July 12, 1941. A fight between seven or eight Japanese civilians attached to the naval base and French guards of the Hankow concession had resulted in the death of a Japanese chauffeur and the wounding of another. With the permission of Tokyo, Japanese Naval authorities in Hankow had immedi­ately requested from the French the right to partial police control over the French concession, the right of Japanese troops to patrol this area, the transit of armed militia in case of necessity, the official approval of these demands by the French control board, and an apology from its chairman. However, the taking over of the whole French concession at Hankow was to be postponed, until further orders were issued by Tokyo. [841]

Tokyo learned further details of the Hankow incident on July 15, 1941. Five Japanese chauffeurs, attached to the Naval base, had gone to a Chinese restaurant in the French concession, and had later talked with some Chinese Geisha girls on the street. While they were thus engaged, a French concession policeman came on the scene, and an altercation began. When Mr. Shimisu, the Japanese Navy chauffeur, attempted to flee, he had been wounded by police gunfire and stabbed with bayonets: After the first policeman fired, other policemen with rifles had arrived, and all shot at the Japanese Navy automobile in which the Japanese, in­cluding Mr. Shimizu, were attempting to flee. Bayonets were also used, and although one of the policemen had received a bayonet wound, it was clear, said Japanese representatives, that the French had stabbed each other, since none of the Japanese was armed and they had been released by the police on the afternoon of July 12, 1941. According to the Japanese account, the shooting of unarmed men revealed a murderous intent, and the firing on a Navy automobile was an insult to the Japanese Navy. [842]



212. Japanese Policy Towards French Concessions In China.



By July 18, 1941 it was evident that the Hankow incident was to become a test case of Japanese policy towards all French concessions in China. The Japanese Consul in Shanghai, asserting that action taken in regard to this incident would affect Japanese policy towards the French concession in Shanghai, declared that "taking general control of police power" would be no different from taking control of the administrative power in the concession. Although it might be possible to exercise a separate police power in a concession where the Japanese Army also operated, this would not be a comprehensive control of police power.



[840] II, 824.

[841] II, 825, 826.

[842] II, 827.



161



Before Tokyo decided on its action in Hankow, he urged that it should determine carefully its general policy in regard to the French concessions in Tientsin, Canton and Shanghai. Emphasizing the importance of this decision from the standpoint of England and the United States, he pointed out that Japan might be accused of abusing a weaker country, if caution were not observed. [843] However, Tokyo would finally consider it necessary to bring the concession under Japanese control, without actually taking it over. [844]



213. Japanese Preliminary Demands in Hankow.



In order to prevent a recurrence of the Hankow disorder, Tokyo directed on July 21, 1941 that all Japanese military personnel as well as Japanese civilians be forbidden to enter the French concession. The text of the Japanese demands were:



1. Demotion and dismissal of the Annam policeman.

2. The employment by the French concession authorities as police (including patrolmen) of such Japanese or

Chinese as are designated by us.

3. Abolition of all weapons carried by French concession patrolmen, except bayonets.

4. Permission for Japanese army patrols to make the rounds of the French concession.

5. Permission for Japanese armored units to cross the French concession in case the need should occur.

6. An apology from the authorities concerned in this incident.

7. Indemnity for the injured of Y 63,875.

8. Compensation for the damaged car, Y 8,175.

9. Punishment for the offenders and those concerned in the incident. [845]



On July 22, 1941 Tokyo informed its representatives that the French concessions would not be taken over, nor would the exercise of full police power be suggested since this also touched upon the very nature of the concessions. [846] Three days later, on July 25, 1941, the French Coun­selor in Tokyo, calling on Vice Minister Kumaichi Yamamoto, requested that a peaceful settlement be reached. [847]



214. Japan's Final Terms in the Hankow Incident.



The Japanese representatives in Hankow reported to Tokyo, on July 31, 1941, what seemed to be the final details of the settlement. These included: the dismissal and immediate repa­triation of all Annam policemen; an apology by the Superintendent of Police; a 40,000 yen indemnity; the employment of Chinese policemen, designated by Japan, in place of the 65 Annam policemen dismissed; the arms of the French concession police were to be limited to bayonets; two qualified Chinese, designated by Japan, were to be employed as police super­intendents; and one reliable French speaking Japanese or Chinese was to be a liaison officer between Japanese and French authorities. In addition Japanese military and naval patrols and gendarmes were to have access to the concession as well as Japanese troops, who would be allowed to cross the concession at will. [848]



[843] II, 828.

[844] II, 829.

[845] II, 830.

[846] II, 831.

[847] II, 832.

[848] II, 833.



162



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



215. Japan Plans to Use French Indo-China as a Base for Attacks on Singapore and the East Indies.



The Hankow incident was the least of France's difficulties at this time, for Japan was pre­paring other moves against French interests. On July 14, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador in Vichy was informed that preparations were being completed for the Japanese army to move against French Indo-China on or about July 20, 1941. [849] This was a reflection of an important statement of Japanese objectives and military plans in the Far East, which was announced also on July 14, 1941 by Japanese military officials in Canton. It explained that a recent mobi­lization order had expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo‑Ameri­can interference, with Axis assistance, if possible, but alone if necessary.

Because these military officials did not wish to arouse the feelings of the Japanese populace, and desired to face a new war with a calm and cool attitude, formalities such as dining and saying farewell to the troops had been omitted. The Japanese plans were expressed as follows:



The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two. In the main, through the activities of our air arm (in your city, the Spratly Islands, Parao, Thaiese Singora, Portuguese Timor and French Indo-China) and our submarine fleet (in the South Seas Mandate Islands, Hainan Island, and French Indo-China) we will once and for all crush Anglo‑American military power and their ability to assist in any schemes against us.

The troops soon to occupy French Indo-China will be reorganized as the 25th Army Corps (one Army Corps con­sists of four divisions) and also the 30th Army Corps, consisting of the South China forces, which will be assigned to special duty with airplanes, tanks, and howitzers. General IIDA (the RDA Army mentioned in preceding tele­grams has been changed to the Nishimura detachment) will be placed in command and general military head­quarters will be set up in Saigon. All preparations have been made. The ship fees have been paid and the expedi­tion will soon proceed from here. [850]



Berlin was advised on July 15, 1941 that Japanese‑French negotiations had begun, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka made the following significant statement:



This marks the first step in our southward advance; at the same time, it signified a very grave life and death step in our relations with England and America. We have thrown in our lot with Germany and Italy in harmony with the Tripartite Pact and intend to cooperate with them. [851]



216. Japan Sets the Date for the Occupation of French Indo-China.



On July 16, 1941 Japan informed its representatives in Hanoi and Saigon of the impending invasion of the Southern portion of French Indo-China. Even though the French government and French Indo‑Chinese authorities might oppose this move, Japan was determined to carry it through. All Japanese nationals were to be evacuated by July 23, 1941, and the Imperial portraits were to be placed in the custody of the Provincial Office at Takao. For security, all telegraphic codes with the exception of those absolutely essential were to be burned, and other telegraphic and secret materials were likewise to be destroyed. [852]

On July 16, 1941 Japanese military authorities in Canton informed Tokyo that the troops slated to occupy French Indo-China were scheduled to leave Canton on July 17, 1941, and to arrive at Saigon two weeks later, after stopping over at Hainan Island. [853]



[849] II, 834.

[850] II, 835.

[851] II, 836.

[852] II, 837.

[853] II, 838.



163



217. Japan Requests Germany and Italy to Recommend to France Acceptance of Japan's Proposals.



Though Japan understood that Vichy was looking to Germany for support in refusing or less­ening Japanese demands, Foreign Vice‑Minister Chuichi Ohashi invited the German and Italian ambassadors in Tokyo to call separately on July 15, 1941, and asked that their govern­ments recommend to France acceptance of Japan's ultimatum. Both ambassadors replied that the request would be communicated to their respective governments at once. [854]



218. New Japanese Cabinet Continues Japan's Policy towards French Indo-China.



When the Japanese Cabinet resigned on July 17, 1941, the Foreign Office thought it neces­sary, on July 19, to inform the Vichy government that Japan's policy towards French Indo-China would in no way be affected. This was mentioned to counteract any erroneous belief which might arise concerning Japan's intention of changing her attitude or demands. [855]

Informed on July 19, 1941 that Japanese military preparations were complete, and that re­gardless of the French answer, the Army of Occupation would move forward on July 24, 1941, (previously set for July 17, 1941), [856] Ambassador Kato directed the French government to warn French Indo‑Chinese authorities to avert a clash of armed forces. [857] Ambassador Kato had been instructed that in case the French accepted the ultimatum, he should make them accede to all Japanese demands; but if they rejected it, he was to inform the French that Japan had no alternative but to occupy southern French Indo-China. The Japanese Ambassador in Vichy had also been instructed to tell French authorities that their reply would have to reach Japan not later than July 23, 1941. [858]



219. Japan Informs Germany of Its Irrevocable Decision to Occupy French Indo-China.



After being informed by Ambassador Kato that the French government, ostensibly in con­sideration of the Berlin‑Vichy armistice, had found it necessary to confer with the Germans on this matter, Vice Minister Chuichi Ohashi advised Ambassador Eugene Ott of Germany that whether the Japanese ultimatum were accepted or refused, military action would be taken. This might jeopardize the status of French Indo-China, as well as Tokyo‑Vichy and Berlin-Vichy relations. Ambassador Ott indicated that the Russian war might prevent Germany from exerting pressure on Vichy, but promised to deliver Tokyo's message to Berlin immediately. [859]



220. Japan Demands a French Agreement by July 22, 1941.



Ambassador Kato reported to Tokyo that in conferring with Vice Premier Darlan on July 19, 1941, he had presented a demand that France accede to the proposal by 6:00 P.M. on Tuesday, July 22. The Vice Premier answered that a reply would probably be given on the next day, July 21, 1941, after a conference with Marshal Petain. [860]



[854] II, 839.

[855] II, 840.

[856] II, 838, 841.

[857] II, 841.

[858] II, 842.

[859] II, 843.

[860] II, 844, 845.



164



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



221. Ambassador Kato Learns Unofficial Details of Anticipated Agreement.



Ambassador Kato, following his talk with Vice Premier Darlan, conferred with Mr. Lenoir Messien, Council President, who informed him, unofficially, that a final decision had been reached as follows:



(a) France recognizes Japan's demands.

(b) Japan shall first of all make a public statement concerning the maintenance of the territorial integrity of French Indo-China.

(c) The French forces will cooperate with the Japanese only in resisting the infringement of third powers and will cooperate in no aggressive schemes whatever. [861]



President Messien said that an official reply would be forthcoming on the matter, either on July 20 or July 21, 1941. The Council President added that France could not expect its army to cooperate with Japan unless some sort of assurance by means of a public message, such as the one contained in Prince Konoye's message to Marshal Petain, were published. France was cooperating with the Japanese simply for defense, and would not engage in military aggression. [862]

The Japanese Ambassador, in view of an anticipated demand of French authorities for assurance, in the form of a protocol, that the French Indo‑Chinese army would not have to participate in plans of an offensive nature, asked that he be advised immediately of Japan's decision on this matter. [863]



222. Tokyo and Vichy Discuss Details of the Agreement.



Tokyo agreed to accept the protocol desired by the French, but realizing that his Foreign Office would wish to have the final text in both French and Japanese, the Japanese Ambassador in Vichy suggested that only the French language be used since speed was the prime requisite. If both languages were used, the French authorities would be able to delay a great many days in examining the Japanese text. [864]

The tentative protocol as drafted by the French on July 21, 1941 stated that the exceptional facilities accorded the Japanese could not, under any circumstances, have the character of a military occupation, and that the Japanese should confine themselves strictly to the needs of the military operations. Although they were to be subject to French military authorities, Japanese expeditionary forces would be accorded freedom of passage between the point of disembarking and the zone of operations, and their military activities would be limited to the territories located north of the Red River. In the zone of operations, the French administrative and military authorities were to remain at their posts and in possession of all their powers. The armed Japanese forces were not to exceed two‑thirds of the effectives actually mobilized in Tonking, which meant they were not to exceed 25,000 men. [865] The details of the actual landing points, number of troops, and places to station them would be decided upon as soon as the French officially recognized Japan's demands.

In answer to the questions raised by Ambassador Kato, the Japanese Foreign Office replied that the following decisions had been made: the title of the protocol dealing with joint defenses



[861] II, 846.

[862] II, Ibid.

[863] II, 847.

[864] II, 848.

[865] II, 849.

[866] II, 850,



165



would be changed to read "Regarding Territorial Integrity and Joint Defenses of French Indo-China", and an article would be added to the original draft, stating that "The Japanese government declares that it will respect the territorial Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire integrity of Indo-China, and the sover­eignty of France over the Indo-China Federation". Although Japan had no objection to the statement in the French reply of acceptance that the French Indo‑Chinese army would not cooperate in any plans of aggression, such a demand was not to be incorporated into the formal document. If the French were to insist, Japan preferred to have a secret exchange of notes in regard to the matter, or a statement by the French only. As a last resort, it was suggested that this clause be added as a qualifying explanation to Article I of the protocol.

Directing that in the protocol no time limit be set on the occupation despite the wishes of the French for such a restriction, Tokyo explained that it would be possible to change the protocol at any time by mutual agreement between the two countries. However, if France insisted, Japan would agree to a five‑year time limit. [867]



223. France Accepts Japan's Ultimatum (July 21, 1941).



The text of the French acceptance of the Japanese ultimatum was delivered to Ambassador Kato on July 21, 1941 by Vice Premier Darlan, [868] who explained that France had no alternative but to accept the Japanese demands. There would be those, he pointed out, who would protest against the paradox of France's resisting the British in Syria on one hand and welcoming Japanese troops in French Indo-China on the other hand.

Vice Premier Darlan asked that Japan publish the statement assuring the sovereignty of French Indo-China, which had been set forth in a supplement to the French reply to the Japanese demands. The Vice Premier also requested that his country be assured by Japan that French Indo‑Chinese forces would not be removed from their posts, that demands would not be made on the various facilities being used by the French forces, and that war and merchant vessels would not be ordered from their present berths. [869]



224. Ambassador Kato Explains France's Acceptance.



The Japanese Ambassador to Vichy declared on the following day, July 22, 1941, that the reason why the French had so readily accepted Japan's proposal was that they saw how resolute Japan's determination was, and how swift its action. In short, France had no alterna­tive but to yield. Although territorial integrity of Indo-China had been granted, Japan had decided on a military occupation, according to Ambassador Kato, under the guise of a joint agreement with France.

Pointing out that the France‑Japanese relationship was very delicate, the Japanese Ambassa­dor warned Tokyo that, if France were forced to participate in whatever military operations Japan should undertake, the French people and officials would become so incensed that a permanent estrangement might result. Furthermore, Vice Premier Darlan had advised that if the withdrawal of French troops were demanded, or if private property were confiscated, the wrath of the French in southern French Indo-China would be "terrible". [870]



[867] II, 851.

[868] II, 852.

[869] II, 853, 854.

[870] II, 855.



166



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



225. Tokyo Agrees to Accept the French Protocol.



On July 22, 1941, Tokyo, apparently not yet aware of Vichy's formal acceptance, had in­structed Ambassador Kato that if the French government's reply did not differ from the statement made by Council President Messien, he was to inform French officials that Japan would comply with their wishes."' Unfortunately, some of the dispatches relating to these negotiations were not intercepted by United States Communication Intelligence agencies, and so some of the points discussed cannot be clarified.

Ambassador Kato was also instructed to proceed with negotiations on the basis of the French draft, but after the draft had been put into its final shape, Tokyo would compose a Japanese version of the text."' Tokyo received word from Ambassador Kato as to the official French confirmation of the agreement later on in the day of July 22, 1941. [873]



226. France Begins Pro‑Japanese Propaganda.



To an inquiry concerning the treatment of the Japanese‑French agreement in the French press, the Japanese Ambassador reported, on July 24, 1941, that in all probability, newspaper editors had "waxed fanciful" because no official statement had been made by the Vichy government. Vice Minister Roshier had stated in a private interview with a Japanese representative that insofar as France was concerned, it was necessary to prepare public opinion to counteract recent propaganda of England and the United States. He had stressed the necessity of publicly expressing France's "willing cooperation" with Japan in the Far East. [874]



227. Japan Launches a World‑Wide Propaganda Campaign.



Japan prepared to launch a world‑wide propaganda campaign simultaneously with its occupation of French Indo-China. Instructions for the dissemination of propaganda concern­ing the occupation of French Indo-China were very detailed. The main objective was to induce the French Indo‑Chinese to give whole‑hearted cooperation to the Japanese during any emergency that might arise. At the same time the Japanese hoped to have the people of the South Seas place more reliance on Japan, and since they could not carry out their plans for propaganda in Burma, Malaya, India, Netherlands East Indies and Australia, they felt it best to develop their interests in French Indo-China and Thailand. Particular attention was to be paid to the Netherlands East Indies for the sake of the oil therein, and to Australia so that its movement for independence would be encouraged. [875]

Planning to issue a statement discussing the defense of greater East Asia, the emancipation of oppressed people, the destruction of the British and United States policy of the "almighty dollar", and the promotion of anti‑Communism, the Japanese intended to encourage the Wang regime on one hand and to apply pressure on the Chungking government on the other. Mean­while, they expected the Chinese and the South Sea natives to develop loyalty to Japan. To offset British, American, Chinese and Dutch propaganda, the Japanese propagandists were not to give the impression that further military penetrations were to be made southwards nor that military ties with Thailand were being sought.



[871] II, 856.

[872] II, 857.

[873] II, 858.

[874] II, 859.

[875] II, 860.



167



As for propaganda work in the United States, the Japanese were to emphasize that United States' policies could not lead to world peace. Furthermore, the Japanese planned to conduct a racial campaign in the countries of Central and South America to separate them from North America. In the Soviet Union, the Japanese were to intimate that the United States was interested only in the South Pacific. [876]



228. Japan Refuses to Set a Time Limit on the Occupation of French Indo-China.



On July 22, 1941 the French Vice Premier reiterated that France was participating in the agreement with Japan only with the view of safeguarding Indo‑Chinese territory, and that it understood that the presence of the Japanese forces was temporary, and would cease when the foreseen danger had been removed. [877] In answer to this statement, Tokyo informed Mr. Kato that he was never to use the term "temporary" in connection with the protocol, since Japan did not wish to make any promises whatever. Instead, Ambassador Kato was to state that "The presence of Japanese forces in waters of the union will terminate when the danger is removed. [878] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire



229. Japan and France Sign a Joint Defense Agreement for French Indo-China.



On July 23, 1941, an agreement for joint defense of French Indo-China was signed by Japan and France. All that remained to be done was the drawing up of the protocol which was to be published later. [879]

Ambassador Kato, on July 24, 1941, submitted a French suggestion to Tokyo that a clause concerning damages resulting from the occupation of the Japanese Army be written into the protocol or into a diplomatic note. Advising that it would be well to leave this matter to the Army of Occupation, Mr. Kato replied that France shared the responsibility for defending the colony, and that to write the: matter into a formal diplomatic document would not be proper. [880]

The Japanese Ambassador informed Foreign Minister Toyoda that France was ready to accept the second Japanese draft of the protocol, with the exception of two minor changes. Tokyo approved these changes, but in regard to the retention of Japanese troops, it directed elimination of the phrase "this shall be only temporary". [881] During the next two days, minor considerations were being cleared up. It was decided that in the French text the name of France should be placed first, whereas in the Japanese text, Japan's name should come first. [882]

The Japanese Privy Council was scheduled to meet in full session on July 28, 1941, and immediately following its approval of the protocol, Vichy was to be notified by telegraph. As soon as Ambassador Kato received this official notification, he was to have the protocol signed and the texts exchanged. The hour, date, and manner of signing was to be sent immediately to Tokyo so that the whole text of the protocol could be published at that time. [883]



[876] II, Ibid.

[877] II, 861.

[878] II, 862.

[879] II, 863, 864.

[880] II, 865.

[881] II, 866, 867.

[882] II, 868, 869.

[883] II, 870.



168



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



230. Japan Thanks Germany for Its Assistance.



The signing of the joint Japanese‑French treaty was announced on July 24, 1941 to Ambassa­dor Oshima, who was asked to inform the German government that Japan and France had succeeded in coming to an agreement. While thanking German officials for their cooperation, Ambassador Oshima was to inform them confidentially of the contents of the Japanese government's statement which would be issued at noon, July 26, 1941. [884] A similar announcement which outlined Japan's motives for its actions and gave some details of the negotiations was sent to the Nanking government in China. [885]



231. British Press Attacks the Japanese Occupation.



From London came the report that English newspapers were interpreting the securing of military bases in French Indo-China as the first step by Japan in a further movement against Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. For this reason, it was suggested that an official statement be issued by Tokyo to the effect that the Japanese‑French Indo-China agreement had been originated to preserve the peace of East Asia, and that no aggression was intended. [886]



232. Japan Reorganizes Its Representation in French Indo-China.



After the signing of the treaty with France, Foreign Minister Toyoda immediately concerned himself with plans to establish a powerful diplomatic organization in French Indo-China, which would involve disbanding the Japanese headquarters in Hanoi. Declaring that such a plan had no object other than to place all diplomatic activities under one head, he asked that France be notified that a special ambassador would be sent to French Indo-China, and that members of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Foreign Office would be assigned to work with him. All negotiations between the Army of Occupation and Indo‑Chinese authorities were to be carried on through the new Japanese Ambassador. [887]



233. Japanese Leaders Congratulate French Authorities.



Following the conclusion of negotiations, congratulatory messages were sent to Marshal Petain and Vice Premier Darlan. Prime Minister Konoye, in commending Marshal Petain on France's courageous decision, expressed his firm belief that this act would serve to cement friendly relations between the two countries, and Foreign Minister Toyoda conveyed his sincere appreciation to Vice Premier Darlan for making possible the signing of this pact. [888]



[884] II, 871.

[885] II, 872.

[886] II, 873.

[887] II, 874.

[888] II, 875, 876.



169



PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD



(h) Japanese‑Chungking Relations.



234. Conflicting Rumors of a Japanese‑Chinese Peace.



Japanese diplomats in Rome reported on May 20, 1941 that Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek's proposal to send a personal diplomatic envoy to the Vatican had been refused because the Vatican could cooperate only in policies of peace between China and Japan. [889] Several days later Tokyo was notified that because of distrust of Japan's behavior, Chungking authorities would not talk of peace unless they received a guarantee from the United States. [890]

According to Tokyo's own estimate of the Chinese situation, Japanese plans to establish a "New Order" in East Asia were being impeded by British‑American aid to China and by an encirclement by England, the United States and the Netherlands. Many Japanese felt, however, that England was wavering due to its defeats and the Japanese threat to the south, and it was the belief of some that Japanese successes were discouraging the Chinese. [891]

Ambassador Biddle in England was quoted in a Japanese report as saying to a friend that Ambassador Winant would soon arrive in Washington to discuss the Chinese problem, and that Lord Hankey planned to make an unofficial trip to persuade the United States to bring an end to Chinese difficulties. Mr. Biddle remarked that it was an opportune time for such a project. However, many Japanese authorities believed that China, having been spurred on by British‑American aid and by the hope that the United States would fight Japan, was abandoning any schemes of capitulation, and was planning to fight on to the bitter end. [892]

As for opinion in the United States, Japanese officials reported on May 26, 1941 that Senators Wheeler, George, and Nye of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had asked the President to suspend aid to China, but that Mr. Roosevelt had avoided comment. [893]



235. American and British Aid to China.



In spite of rumors of a Japanese‑Chinese peace, Chinese‑American collaboration in air and truck transportation of military supplies through Russia was reported on May 27, 1941, follow­ing Captain James Roosevelt's visit to Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek. [894] Five hundred American trucks were to be furnished for the transportation of military supplies. [895] Further evidence that the United States was continuing her aid to China was supplied by Japanese intelligence agents who reported on May 29, 1941 that a part of the $50,000,000 American loan to China would be used to purchase 800 airplanes from the United States. Noting that Ameri­can pilots and mechanics would be sent to handle the planes, the Japanese also were aware that a Boeing plane, one of the two types contracted for, could leave a base in China, raid Tokyo for two hours, and then return to China. [896]



[889] II, 877.

[890] II, 878.

[891] II, 879‑880.

[892] II, 881, 877.

[893] II, 882.

[894] II, 883.

[895] II, 884.

[896] II, 885.



170



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



Though the United States would send men to improve the Burma Road in order to increase the flow of goods to China, they would not take part in the war. Furthermore, because the out­break of the Russo‑German war had stopped the supply of materials from Russia, Tokyo was informed on July 10, 1941 that the activities of the pacifists in Chungking were already gaining ground. However, American representative, Mr. Owen Latimore, had been sent to China to counteract talk of an early peace, [897] and high officials in Chungking were elated over this indication of unified British‑American‑Russian aid to China. [898] But a report from Hong­kong on July 16, 1941 concerning a recent conference of American, British, Chinese and Rus­sian representatives assured Tokyo that there was no possibility of a military alliance of these four nations since the lack of aid given to China demonstrated that the other three powers were more concerned with their difficulties than with China's plight. [899]

However, by the end of July 1941, the British and American program for aiding the stricken peoples of China had progressed so well that plans were made with the Chungking government for the defense of Yunnan by a British mechanized force and American air units. The reorgani­zation of the tin mines, the reopening of the Temmen highway, and the development of the traffic facilities of Keinan would help to guarantee the economic security of this area. [900]

According to a report on August 4, 1941 from Chungking sources, the Financial Reconstruc­tion Program in China, entirely separate from the Industrial Commercial Bureau, was con­trolled by British and American experts. The Japanese were informed that Madame Chiang Kai‑shek, with Mr. Kung Hsiang-Hsi, a member of the Central Executive Bureau of Kiangsu Province, handled all diplomatic affairs. [901]

To expedite transportation between Calcutta and Chungking, British, American and Chi­nese forces were planning to build a military road through Darjeeling, Tibet and Seita. In con­nection with the construction of this road, Tokyo was informed on August 5, 1941 that engineer­ing materials were being assembled and prepared in the United States. Fourteen or fifteen American aviators and bomber technicians with twenty more to follow, were already en route to Chungking with a cargo consisting of military material and large caliber guns which had left San Francisco on July 15, 1941. [902]



236. Japan Fears Chungking‑Chinese Communist Collaboration.



Japan feared the great potential power of China, and, therefore, was greatly concerned with the growing collaboration between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties. A Japanese re­port of May 24, 1941 discussed prospective negotiations for a Chinese Communist‑Kuomintang rapprochement. [903] In a report to Tokyo on June 4, 1941 discussing a meeting of Japanese intel­ligence agents, it was stated that the solution of outstanding questions between Japan and Russia as well as the movements of the Chinese and the Manchukuoan Communist Parties would be discussed at the next conference. [904]



[897] II, 886.

[898] II, 887.

[899] II, 888-889.

[900] II, 890.

[901] II, 891.

[902] II, 892.

[903] II, 893.

[904] II, 894.

Monday, May 25, 2009

negative effects 3.neg.1995 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Moller plans to examine whether boys in majority-girl preschool classes interact with female peers more often than other boys do, perhaps aiding their developmental progress. It’s also possible that teachers in classes with more boys than girls select less intellectually challenging activities for students, with especially harsh developmental consequences for boys, he notes. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Earlier investigations found that girls assist each other in learning new skills more than boys do in preschool classes. Strategies to foster greater cooperation among preschool boys, especially in majority-boy classes, are also worth exploring, Moller says.

The lack of negative effects on girls in majority-boy classes may partly stem from an already reported tendency for black and Latino girls to argue with peers of both sexes as aggressively as boys do, he suggests. These girls may feel at ease and resist intimidation in classes dominated by boys.

Thursday, May 14, 2009

against 4.agi.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Carbohydrates have taken another hit. A new study finds that a low-carb diet results in greater weight loss and better cholesterol readings than a low-fat regimen that promotes a lot of grains and fruits. A Mediterranean diet that incorporates some of each diet yielded results that fell between the two, researchers in Israel report in the July 17 New England Journal of Medicine.

By conducting a trial within a single workplace, the scientists managed to keep 85 percent of the study participants on their respective diets for a full two years, a coup among diet studies. High dropout rates have historically skewed the results of such studies.

While people lost at least some weight on all three diets in this trial, the differences were significant. “The old food pyramid is going to get turned on an angle,” says study coauthor Iris Shai, a nutritional epidemiologist at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. “Maybe now it’s a little more questionable that we should be basing our diets on carbohydrates.”

Shai and her team recruited 322 overweight people with an average age of 52 and randomly assigned them in roughly equal groups to one of the three diets. Most of the participants were men.

The low-fat diet closely adhered to guidelines developed by the American Heart Association, in which people are counseled to eat plenty of low-fat grains, vegetables, fruits and legumes. Dietitians counseled participants to strictly limit fats and meats, to avoid sweets and fatty snacks and to keep their daily calorie intake under 1,800 a day for men and 1,500 for women.

A second group was assigned a Mediterranean diet, which had the same overall calorie limits. But these people could eat fats, mainly olive oil and nuts, in moderation. The Mediterranean dieters also ate poultry and fish but little red meat.

The low-carbohydrate group ate an Atkins diet, in which they could consume all they wanted provided very little of it was carbohydrates. Their carbs topped out at 120 grams per day, but protein and fat intake weren’t limited. The dietitians urged them to choose vegetarian foods when available. All the groups avoided trans fats.

Because the study participants worked at the same facility and ate lunch at the same cafeteria, they were able to obtain food that fit their assigned diets for the midday meal, the largest of the day.

After two years, low-carb dieters had lost an average of 5.5 kilograms and 3.8 centimeters from their waistline. The weight loss was significantly greater than the 3.3 kilograms lost by the low-fat dieters, who carved 2.8 centimeters off their average waistlines. The Mediterranean dieters showed results between the two.

Dieters in the low-carb group also raised their average HDL cholesterol, the good kind, by 8.4 points, 2 points more than the other groups. LDL, the bad cholesterol, didn’t change significantly in the groups.

Also, the low-carb and Mediterranean dieters lowered their blood levels of triglycerides (fats) significantly more than the low-fat group.

Other studies have tackled the low-fat versus low-carb issue, bringing mixed results. Some found that low-carb diets induced quick weight loss, but that the early gains faded after six months.

“This study clearly is longer than anything we’ve seen so far,” says internist William Yancy Jr. of Duke University and the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Durham, N.C. Combined, this study and some previous reports “are showing repeatedly that higher-fat diets do not worsen the overall blood cholesterol profile,” he says.

Whether this study will single-handedly change how nutrition experts counsel people remains to be seen. Nutrition guidelines evolve very slowly, says Christopher Gardner, a nutrition scientist at Stanford University. But he notes that the Mayo Clinic Healthy Weight Pyramid has recently changed, with fruits and vegetables now at the bottom, and grains just above in a lesser role.

“This study is totally in line with that,” Gardner says.

But the findings run counter to many food pyramids still touted as the basis of a healthy diet. While the U.S. Department of Agriculture rearranged its pyramid in 2005 to reflect a greater mix of foods, it still promotes plenty of grains and other carbohydrates.

Part of the hesitation to change rests on the fact that scientists are still sorting out exactly how a low-carb diet works. For some reason, low-carb dieters don’t gorge themselves even though the diet allows them to eat all they want, minus the carbohydrates.

In this study, the people who stayed on the low-carb diet reported feeling full, says Shai. “This is a high-protein diet, and high protein means much more satiety.” After drastically reducing carbohydrate intake, a person experiences lower insulin and glucose levels in the blood. That, in turn, curbs an individual’s craving for sweets, she says.

Gardner says low-carb dieters also find eating less interesting. “There’s just a smaller choice of options,” he says. “Foods simply get boring and you don’t want as many of them, once you take away the carbs.”

The explanation may lie in our evolutionary origins, Gardner says. “We evolved in another way,” he says, which was to eat a lot of leafy vegetables and meat proteins. “Since the agrarian revolution, we’ve eaten too many grains with too many calories—and it’s killing us,” he says. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

It remains to be seen whether the low-carb diet can reduce long-term health risks, such as heart attacks, Yancy says. For the low-carb dieters, the new study used the Atkins diet. Robert Atkins first proffered the diet in 1972, but the idea didn’t gain much traction with the public until the 1990s, when his regimen and others rapidly found popularity. Other variations include the Zone diet and the South Beach diet. The new study was supported in part by the Dr. Robert C. and Veronica Atkins Foundation.